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Abstract
Settlements are often considered to be welfare-enhancing because
they save time and litigation costs. In the presence of court error,
however, this conclusion may be wrong. Court decisions create posi-
tive externalities for future litigants which will not occur if a dispute
is settled out of court. Focusing on private litigation, we examine
the impact of court error on the deterrent effect of the strict liability
rule. In an asymmetric information setup both, underdeterrence and
overdeterrence are possible under court error. Moreover, court error
increases the likelihood of out-of-court settlements which can offset
the positive externality of litigation.
Keywords: litigation, settlement, asymmetric information, court error, strict
liability rule.
JEL-Classification: K13, K41
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper by Becker (1968), it is well known that when pri-
vate parties know exactly what behavior a legal rule requires, large penalties,
combined with a sufficiently high probability that infringements will be pe-
nalized, create proper incentives to comply with the law. When, in addition,
the legal authority observes individual risks and benefits, it is possible to
establish a rule that deters those persons from engaging in an activity who
cause large negative externalities. That is, under perfect information, an
appropriate legal rule will ensure socially optimal behavior.
In reality, however, information is hardly ever perfect and legal standards
are often vague. Many rules are formulated to prohibit things like “unreason-
able behavior” or “substantial injury,” and even when the language is more
to the point, enforcement policies may be unknown or at least difficult to
predict. What makes matters worse is that courts do make mistakes. This
may imply that defendants who did not violate a legal rule are fined, while
others who did violate the rule escape unpunished. The crucial point is that
rules are phrased in terms of behavior that is difficult to observe: this is
especially a problem when courts are dealing with an issue for the first time.
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of court error on the
deterrent effect of the law. We argue that court error creates legal uncertainty
that can distort the incentives created by a legal rule in different ways: in
some cases, court error may lead to more deterrence than is socially optimal;
in other cases to less. Even though court error may never be eliminated
completely, there is good evidence to suppose that the error rate will decrease
with the number of cases: judges get better in observing and interpreting
the legally relevant facts when they have dealt with a similar issue before.
That is, litigation creates a positive externality for future litigants because
the outcome of a trial is easier to predict if one can draw on a precedent
decision. Such a decision, however, will only exist if a former case has been
taken to court. Since the legal system often explicitly encourages the parties
to settle out of court, this positive externality will not necessarily occur.
The literature on the economics of litigation and settlement generally
considers settlement agreements to be welfare-enhancing because they offer
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a preferable alternative to the cost and uncertainty of litigation.1 This con-
clusion is entirely true if liability and damage awards are not in doubt; in the
context of court error, however, this conclusion may be misleading. Though it
is undisputed that settlements save time and litigation cost in the short run,
they can be detrimental to long-run expected welfare. Usually, the parties to
a settlement contract do not disclose the details of their agreement. This de-
prives the public—and especially the court—of useful information for similar
disputes in the future. Specifically, this means that out-of-court settlements
are not helpful in reducing the uncertainty concerning the enforcement of a
legal rule.
A Brief Overview of the Model. We consider a sequence of legal dis-
putes on similar issues. At each point in time, a new potential injurer can
engage in an identical activity generating a personal gain. This activity is
likely to harm a victim who sues for damages. A lawsuit can either be settled
out of court or go to trial. Damage awards in court may be affected by court
error.
The activity may either cause low harm or high harm; injurers do not
observe the true level of harm, but they know its distribution. There are
two types of injurers: low-risk injurers, who mainly cause low harm, and
high-risk injurers, who mainly cause high harm. The personal gain from the
activity is the same for both types, but engaging in the activity is ex-ante
only efficient for low-risk injurers. Since “risk” is not verifiable in court, it
is ineffective to impose a ban on the activities of high-risk injurers; instead,
strict liability should be applied.
Court error is modeled that a judge sometimes mistakes the true level of
harm and thus awards high damages to a victim who has suffered low harm,
or low damages to a victim who has suffered high harm. He is supposed to be
the less likely to err, the more often he and other judges have dealt with the
activity before.2 That is, we assume that the risk of court error will decrease
1For an overview on the literature see the surveys of Daughety (2000) and Spier (2007).
2In general, the literature on settlements assumes that the judge learns the truth and,
thus, makes damage awards equal to the true level of harm. In contrast, our model
allows for court error. We assume that with an exogenously specified probability, the
judge will learn the true level of harm and award adequate damages to the victim; with
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with each additional dispute that is terminated by trial. In contrast, disputes
that are terminated by settlement do not have an impact on court error.
Settlement negotiations are supposed to take the form of an ultimatum
game where the injurer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the victim. The
victim decides whether to accept the offer and drop the case, or to reject it
and go to trial. The minimum settlement offer that the victim will accept is
his expected damage award in court.
It is quite obvious that in absence of court error the strict liability rule will
provide the right incentives to high-risk injurers to refrain from the activity
and—if legal costs are low enough—to low-risk injurers to engage in the
activity. In presence of court error, however, this needs not to be true. We
find that court error increases the expected damage award for low harm
and decreases the expected damage award for high harm: as a result, high-
risk injurers can expect to pay less in damages than the harm they will
cause, while low-risk injurers must expect to pay more. Depending on the
parameters of the model, strict liability may deter too little or too much
activity. Underdeterrence turns out to be a problem when the personal gain
from the activity is high; overdeterrence turns out to be a problem when the
gain is low. High legal costs also promote overdeterrence.
Besides its distortionary impact on the deterrent effect of the strict li-
ability rule, court error may also affect the settlement process. It is well
known from the literature that asymmetric information may cause settle-
ment negotiations to fail; court error, however, may increase the likelihood
of settlements.3
The standard argument why asymmetric information may cause settle-
ment negotiations to fail is as follows. The injurer does not observe the true
level of harm and so must offer a high settlement amount (equal to the ex-
pected damage award for high harm) if he wants to be sure that the victim
will not go to court; however, since this high offer exceeds the reservation
the complementary probability, however, he will mistake the true level and award wrong
damages. The role of the court is entirely non-strategic and the learning effect from
previous trials is exogenously given. In particular, we consider a non-Bayesian judge who
does not form beliefs on the true level of harm.
3Seminal papers on settlement under asymmetric information are Bebchuk (1984) and
Reinganum and Wilde (1986).
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price of a low-harm victim, the injurer might probably be better off offering
a low settlement amount (equal to the expected damage award for low harm)
and risking a trial when the victim rejects. Typically, the first strategy is
referred to as pooling, and the second strategy is referred to as separating.
Making a separating offer turns out to be the more profitable for the
injurer the larger the difference between the expected damage awards, the
smaller the probability that the activity has caused high harm, or the smaller
the legal costs. As a result, we find that low-risk injurers are more likely to
make a separating offer than high-risk injurers. However, if the expected
damage award for low harm is only slightly lower than the expected damage
award for high harm, then neither high-risk nor low-risk injurers should risk
a trial. This is because in this case the surplus, which a low-harm victim
is paid under the pooling offer, is low compared to the expected trial costs
under the separating offer. That is, due to the fact that court error increases
the expected damage award for low harm and decreases the expected damage
award for high harm, we find that court error increases the attractiveness of
pooling. As a result, both types of injurer should be the more likely to pool—
and thus to strictly settle out of court—the more likely the judge is to make
a mistake. This, however, means that court error has a positive impact on
the likelihood of settlements.
To sum up, our model suggests that court error may have a distortionary
impact on deterrence. Depending on the personal gain of the activity, we
find that the strict liability rule may either deter too little or too much
activity. Nevertheless, underdeterrence needs not to be a serious problem
because—due to the positive externality of litigation—the risk of court error
may decrease over time. For this to happen, however, it is necessary that
some disputes are terminated by trial. This will only be the case if the initial
court error is lower than a certain cutoff such that at least low-risk injurers
make a separating settlement offer and, hence, will be brought to trial if their
activity caused high harm.
However, while underdeterrence may disappear over time, the problem
of overdeterrence does not disappear without regulatory intervention: if no
injurer ever engages in the activity, it is impossible for the judge to learn
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from previous trials and so the error rate cannot decrease. Thus, if the strict
liability rule deters too much activity in the short run, it will also deter too
much activity in the long run.
Related Literature. This paper contributes to the broad literature on the
economics of litigation and settlement. For an overview of the literature see
the surveys of Daughety (2000) and Spier (2007).
Roughly speaking, the literature can be divided into two groups: the
differing perceptions, or optimism, models and the asymmetric information
models.4 These two strands of literature provide different explanations for the
existence of trials. Differing perception models suggest that trials result from
differing opinions by the parties about the outcome of a trial: in particular,
trials occur when litigants are too optimistic about their chances to prevail
in court. In contrast, asymmetric information models imply that trials result
from uncertainty of (at least) one party about the value of a trial to the
other.
Furthermore, these two groups of models also differ in the way how the
settlement amount is determined. Differing perceptions models typically in-
volve a bargaining process in which the parties arrive at a settlement amount
somewhere between their reservation prices; that is, the parties will share
the settlement surplus. Asymmetric information models, in contrast, assume
that the uninformed party chooses a settlement amount and offers it to the
opponent on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; the opponent then either accepts the
offer, in which case the parties settle, or rejects and goes to trial. Thus, there
is no bargaining in asymmetric information models.
Our model is in the spirit of the asymmetric information approach by
Bebchuk (1984). As a major difference, we allow for errors made by the
court in assessing the true level of harm.5 With this focus on court error,
our analysis also adds to the debate on the social value of accuracy in adju-
4For models of the first group, see Landes (1971), Gould (1973) and Posner (1973);
more recent analyses are by Shavell (1995) and van Velthoven and van Wijck (2001). For
models of the second group, see Bebchuk (1984), Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Nalebuff
(1987), and Schweizer (1989). For general comparisons of the two approaches see, e.g.,
Baird, Gertner, and Picker (1994), and Miceli (1997, 1998).
5A second difference is that we only allow for two possible levels of harm.
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dication. Relevant contributions to this debate have been made by Cooter
(1984), Shavell (1987), Kaplow (1994), and Kaplow and Shavell (1996); for a
critical evaluation of these contributions see Kaplow (1998) and Arlen (2000).
Cooter (1984) argues that, when the court cannot accurately determine
the true level of harm, a rule of negligence is superior to strict liability because
under a negligence regime the injurers’ behavior is less sensitive to court
error than it would be under strict liability. In contrast, Shavell (1987)
argues that possible error in the measurement of damages does not necessarily
imply that the strict liability rule is inefficient. He shows that strict liability
will provide efficient incentives if damage awards are accurate on average.
Moreover, even when the judge errs on average, Kaplow and Shavell (1996)
show that negligence needs not to be superior to strict liability. The reason
is as follows. In order to determine due care, the judge must be able to
calculate the average harm incurred by the victim. However, if the judge
cannot accurately determine the damage awards under a strict liability rule
then he will probably also fail to determine due care under a negligence rule.
That is, any difficulty the judge faces in assessing damages should affect
negligence liability as well as strict liability.
Our results support Shavell (1987). We find that for sufficiently small
court error the strict liability rule will provide efficient incentives to both low-
risk and high-risk injurers. A statement about the efficiency of the negligence
rule, however, is not possible with our model.
Finally, since we assume that the risk of court error will decrease with
each additional dispute that is terminated by trial, our analysis contributes
also to the literature on the divergence between private and social incentives
to litigate. Shavell (1997) argues that the incentives of private parties to
use the legal system are typically different from what is optimal for the
society as a whole. The resources wasted in litigation do not always have a
corresponding social benefit: cost would be saved—and the proper ex ante
incentives maintained—if the litigants settled for the average damage award
instead. In contrast to the literature, our model points out that disputes may
also be settled too often. Since out-of-court settlements deprive the judge
of useful information for a more accurate damage assessment in the future,
7
they make no contribution to better deterrence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
present the general framework. Section 3 focuses on a representative injurer
and identifies conditions under which he is willing to engage in the activity.
Section 4 presents the results which in the following section 5 are discussed.
The final section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a model with an infinite number of periods. In each period there
are three players: a potential injurer, a victim, and a non-strategic judge.
The injurer can engage in an activity that generates a personal gain. This
activity harms the victim who sues for damages. The legal rule is strict
liability. All players are risk neutral and live for one period.
At the outset of period one, the first injurer decides whether or not to
engage in the activity. If he engages in the activity, his personal gain is
G = x + β, with x > 0 and 0 < β < 1. The harm to the victim may either
be low, 0 < x < G, or high, x = x+1 > G. The Injurer does not observe the
true level of harm, but he knows its distribution. Furthermore, it is common
knowledge that the injurer may be of two types: a low-risk type, L, mainly
causing x, or a high-risk type, H , mainly causing x. The probability that
the injurer is of type L is µ. The injurer knows his risk type which is neither
observable to the victim nor to the judge.
Formally, let Ai denote an injurer having type i = L,H . If he engages in
the activity, he will cause x with probability pi > 0 and x with probability
1 − pi, where pL < 1/2 < pH . Since x = x + 1, the expected harm of Ai’s
activity is
E[x|Ai] = x+ pi. (1)
Engaging in the activity is efficient for low-risk injurers and inefficient for
high-risk injurers, meaning
E[x|AL] < G < E[x|AH ], (2)
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which implies
0 < pL < β < pH < 1, with pL < 1/2 < pH . (3)
We assume that it is common knowledge that the victim prevails with cer-
tainty if he goes to court. Moreover, it is also common knowledge that the
judge sometimes makes a mistake and awards high damages, D, to a victim
who has suffered x, or low damages, D, to a victim who has suffered x. Since
the true level of harm may only be x or x, the strict liability rule implies
that the judge will either award D = x or D = x. The probability for a court
mistake in period one is λ◦ > 0. This probability is publicly known and shall
henceforth be referred to as initial court error.
Legal costs are allocated according to the English rule. Following this
rule, the loser in a trial not only has to pay the court costs and his own legal
expenses, but also those of the winner. In our set-up, the losing party will
be the injurer.6 The sum of total legal costs is exogenously given by C > 0.
The timing of the game played in the first period can be summarized as
follows. In a first stage, nature determines the risk type of the potential
injurer. The injurer then decides whether or not to engage in the activity.
If he engages in the activity, the second stage starts. The injurer chooses a
settlement amount and offers it to the victim on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
The victim decides whether to accept the offer and settle out of court, or
to reject it and go to trial. The victim accepts the settlement offer if he is
indifferent between accepting the settlement and going to trial. We normalize
the settlement costs to zero.7
The game played in the second period differs from the game played in the
first period only in one aspect: namely, the probability with which the judge
makes a mistake. If there has been no trial in period one, the probability
for court error in period two is still λ◦. If, however, there has been a trial
in period one then the judge in period two learns from the previous court
decision and the probability for court error is 0 < λ1 < λ◦.
6Note that this assumption excludes the possibility of nuisance suit. The victim always
expects a positive value of going to court and therefore fills suit if he is not offered a high
enough settlement amount.
7This normalization is not crucial as long as the litigation costs exceed the settlement
costs.
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The same applies to the game played in period three. If there has been
no trial in period one or period two, the court error is λ◦; in this case the
game played in period three will be the same as in period one. If, however,
there has been a trial either in period one or period two, the court error is
0 < λ1 < λ◦ and the game will be different. Similarly, if there has been a
trial in period one and period two, the court error is 0 < λ2 < λ1 < λ◦.
In general terms, the game played in period m is different from the game
played in period m− 1, if there has been a trial in period m− 1. The prob-
ability for a court mistake in period m is λn. The subscript n, 0 ≤ n < m,
denotes the number of previous cases that have been terminated by trial.
The following conditions are satisfied:
λn+1 < λn < 1/2 for all n ∈ N0, and lim
n→∞
λn = 0. (4)
The assumption that λn < 1/2 for all n ∈ N0 implies that in the majority of
cases that go to court the judge will find out the true level of harm and award
true damages to the victim. λn+1 < λn makes sure that the probability for a
court mistake decreases with each additional case that is terminated by trial;
this reflects the fact that judges learn from previous court decisions. Finally,
limn→∞ λn = 0 guarantees that court error can disappear over time.
Remark. As it is evident, efficiency requires that high-risk injurers refrain
from the activity. Henceforth, we will use the term optimal deterrence when
the strict liability rule deters high-risk injurers from the activity, while low-
risk injurers engage in the activity. In the next sections we will investigate
under what conditions optimal deterrence is satisfied even in presence of court
error. We solve for subgame-perfect equilibria in each period.
3 Analysis
We first consider the strategic interaction game between the m-th potential
injurer Ami , i = L,H , and his victim B
m. The injurer decides whether or not
to engage in the activity, knowing that n previous injurers have already been
taken to court; m,n ∈ N0 and 0 ≤ n ≤ (m− 1). We proceed by backward
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induction, beginning with the optimal choice of the settlement offer.8 To
simplify the notation, we will henceforth drop the superscript m and just
refer to injurer Ai and victim B.
3.1 Trial vs. Settlement
First, assume that injurer Ai has caused harm to victim B. B then wants
to hold Ai liable and considers whether or not to litigate. It is important
to note that at this stage of period m, the victim can be of two types: a
low-harm victim who has suffered x, or a high-ham victim who has suffered
x; the probability that B has type x is given by pi.
If B goes to court, the judge will correctly recognize the injurer’s fault
and decide on damages D ∈ {x, x} to be paid to the victim. Court error will
occur with probability λn and so the conditional expected damage awards
are given by
E[D|x] = (1− λn)x+ λnx = x+ λn and
E[D|x] = (1− λn)x+ λnx = x+ (1− λn).
Assumption (4) then implies that x ≥ E[D|x] > E[D|x] ≥ x for all n.
This means that in expectation the injurer will overcompensate for x and
undercompensate for x. In addition, he will also pay the costs of the trial.
Ai’s a priori (that is, before settlement bargaining) expected costs of litigation
amount to
LAi = (1− pi)E[D|x] + piE[D|x] + C
= x+ pi + λn(1− 2pi) + C
and B’s expected net benefits of going to trial are given by
V = E[D|x] = x+ λn if he is of type x, and
V = E[D|x] = x+ (1− λn) if he is of type x.
8The structure of the analysis is in the spirit of van Velthoven and van Wijck (2001).
Yet, in contrast to their model, our rationale why settlement negotiations might fail is
not a differing opinion by the injurer and the victim about the outcome of a trial, but
asymmetric information.
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Note that—independently of his type—litigation has a positive value for B.
This rules out the possibility that B will refrain from a trial even if gets no
out-of-court payment from Ai. Therefore, injurer Ai should try to solve the
dispute out of court.
It is quite obvious that B will only accept an out-of-court settlement that
makes him at least as well off as a trial. Hence, Ai’s settlement offer should
at least be equal to V if B has type x, and at least be equal to V if B has
type x.
However, since Ai cannot observe B’s type, he must offer the high settle-
ment amount V if he wants to be sure that the dispute will not go to trial.
This offer exceeds the reservation price of a low-harm B; hence, Ai might be
better off offering the low settlement amount V and letting the dispute go
to trial if B has type x. Hereafter, we will refer to an offer of V as pooling
offer and to an offer of V as separating offer.9 Injurer Ai’s expected costs of
pooling are then given by
LpoolAi = V = x+ (1− λn), (5)
and his expected costs of separating are given by
LsepAi = (1− pi)V + pi(V + C) = x+ pi(1 + C) + λn(1− 2pi). (6)
The optimal choice between the pooling and the separating offer depends
on a comparison of equation (5) and (6). The next lemma summarizes the
results.10
Lemma 1. Let λi := 1−pi−piC
2−2pi
for i = L,H; and assume that injurer Ai has
harmed victim B.
a) If the court error is smaller than this cutoff, λn < λi, then Ai will offer
the settlement amount V = x+ λn (separating offer) which B will accept if
he has suffered x, and reject if he has suffered x.
9It is straight forward to show that Ai will offer either V or V . Observe first that an
offer of V < V will result in both possible types of B going to court, so it must be inferior
to an offer of V , which a low-harm B will accept. Second, an offer of V > V will induce
both possible types of B to settle but will cost more than V , which is also accepted by
both types. Finally, any offer between V and V is inferior to V because only a low-harm
B accepts either offer but receives more than his reservation price when V > V .
10Lemma 1 implicitly assumes that Ai makes the pooling offer when he is indifferent
between V and V .
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b) If the court error is larger than this cutoff, λn ≥ λi, then Ai will
offer the settlement amount V = x+ 1− λn (pooling offer) which is always
accepted by B.
Corollary. The dispute between injurer Ai and victim B may only enter a
trial if λn < λi; the probability for a trial is then given by pi.
Lemma 1 indicates that separating is preferred if λn < λi. Since ∂λi/∂C < 0
and ∂λi/∂pi < 0 this implies that the injurer is the more likely to make
the separating offer, V , the smaller the court error, the smaller the trial
costs, or the smaller the probability that B has type x. A lower court error
makes the separating offer more attractive because it increases the difference
between V and V , and therefore increases the surplus that a low-harm B
would receive from settling under the pooling offer. Lower trial costs and
a lower probability that B has type x (i.e. a lower pi) also promotes the
separating offer because they reduce the expected costs of being taken to
court. Since pL < pH , it follows that low-risk injurers are ceteris paribus
more likely to separate than high-risk injurers.
Remark. The assumed bargaining procedure—a take-it-or-leave-it offer made
by the injurer—gives the injurer a strong bargaining position. In fact, if the
injurer knew the true level of harm, he could capture the whole surplus
from the settlement. Therefore, the take-it-or-leave-it assumption is likely
to lead to a settlement amount that is more favorable to the injurer (i.e.
lower) than the settlement amount that would result from a more realistic
bargaining procedure. However, the focus of this model does not lie on the
absolute level of the settlement amount but on the impact of court error on
the deterrent effect of the strict liability rule. There are no reasons to expect
the quality of our results to be changed by an assumption that introduces a
downward bias in the absolute level of the settlement amount but leaves the
probability of a settlement unchanged.
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3.2 The initial Question
We now return to the initial question, whether it is interesting enough for
the m-th potential injurer to engage in the activity at all. The answer to
this question does not only depend on the personal gain from the activity
but also on the expected costs of paying damages to the victim: this costs
will be different depending on whether the injurer makes a pooling offer or
a separating offer.
If pooling is the least expensive option to solve the dispute between Ai
and B, then the injurer’s expected net benefit of engaging in the activity is
UpoolAi = G− L
pool
Ai
= β − (1− λn). (7)
Alternatively, if separating is the least expensive option, then his expected
net benefit is
UsepAi = G− L
sep
Ai
= β − pi(1 + C)− λn(1− 2pi). (8)
It is rather obvious that Ai will only engage in a profitable activity. This
means that Ai will only engage in the activity if either G > L
pool
Ai
and/or
G > LsepAi . This leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let βi(λn) := min{1−λn, pi(1+C)+λn(1−2pi)} for i = L,H.
Injurer Ai will then engage in the activity if β > βi(λn), and he will refrain
from the activity if β ≤ βi(λn).
Corollary. Low risk injurers are, ceteris paribus, more likely to engage in
the activity than high-risk injurers because βL(λn) ≤ βH(λn) for all λn < 1/2.
Using Lemmas 1 and 2, we can summarize the equilibrium outcome of period
m in the next Lemma.
Lemma 3. Given the cutoffs λi and βi(λn) defined in Lemmas 1 and 2, the
game between the m-th potential injurer Ai, i = L,H, and victim B has the
following equilibrium outcome:
a) Separating equilibrium: If β > βi(λn) and λn < λi then the injurer
will engage in the activity and offer the settlement amount V = x+ λn. The
victim will accept this offer if he has suffered x and go to court if he has
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suffered x. The expected net benefits are UsepAi = β − pi(1 +C)− λn(1− 2pi),
UsepB|x = λn, and U
sep
B|x = −λn.
b) Pooling equilibrium: If β > βi(λn) and λn ≥ λi then the injurer will
engage in the activity and offer the settlement amount V = x+ 1− λn which
the victim will accept. The expected net benefits are UpoolAi = β − (1 − λn),
UpoolB|x = 1− λn, and U
pool
B|x = −λn.
c) No-activity equilibrium: If β ≤ βi(λn) then the injurer will refrain
from the activity. The expected net benefits are UnaAi = U
na
B|x = U
na
B|x = 0.
Remark. Due to the fact that βL(λn) ≤ βH(λn) for all λn < 1/2, it follows
from Lemma 3 that in any period m ≥ 0 the activity will either attract
both possible types of injurers, only low-risk injurers, or no injurers at all.
Moreover, since ∂βH(λn)/∂λn < 0 and βH(0) ≥ pH > β it is satisfied that
high-risk injurers will definitely refrain from the activity when λn → 0.
4 Results
4.1 Optimal Deterrence
Before characterizing the equilibrium outcome of the model, we will state a
sufficient condition for an arbitrary court error λn to satisfy optimal deter-
rence. We begin with the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let λ̂ := min
{
1− β, pH−β+pHC
2pH−1
, β−pL−pLC
1−2pL
}
. If the court
error is smaller than this cutoff, λn < λ̂, then a potential injurer will engage
in the activity if he is a low-risk type, AL, and refrain from the activity if he
is a high-risk type, AH ; that is, optimal deterrence is satisfied.
Proof. According to Lemma 2, a high-risk injurer will refrain from the ac-
tivity if β < min{1 − λn, pH(1 + C) + λn(1 − 2pH)} and a low-risk injurer
will engage in the activity if β > min{1− λn, pL(1+C) + λn(1− 2pL)}; this
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yields the following conditions for optimal deterrence:
λn < 1− β, (9)
λn(2pH − 1) < pH − β + pHC and (10)
λn(1− 2pL) < β − pL − pLC. (11)
Using the assumption that pL < 1/2 < pH , we can then centralize these
conditions into the statement λn < min
{
1− β, pH−β+pHC
2pH−1
, β−pL−pLC
1−2pL
}
. 
Remark. Proposition 1 gives a sufficient condition for optimal deterrence in
the presence of court error. While this condition makes sure that a potential
injurer will engage in the activity if and only if he is a low-risk type AL, it
is not guaranteed that a legal dispute will end in a settlement. The reason
for this is as follows. For the strict liability rule to deter high-risk injurers
from the activity it is necessary that neither pooling nor separating provides
a positive expected net benefit to AH . Pooling may then not provide a
positive expected net benefit to AL either, because the payoff of pooling is
independent of the injurers’ risk types. However, as under optimal deterrence
low-risk injurers must have an incentive to engage in the activity, it must be
the case that separating provides a positive payoff to AL. This means that an
AL injurer makes the separating offer V = x+λn which, according to Lemma
1, will be accepted if the realized harm is x and rejected if the realized harm
is x. This means that legal disputes are likely to end in a trial, even under
optimal deterrence.
4.2 Convergence to Optimality
Note that the cutoff λ̂, defined in Proposition 1, is negative if C ≥ β−pL
pL
;
this implies that optimal deterrence is impossible when legal costs are too
high. Provided that C < β−pL
pL
, however, there exists a threshold n̂ ≥ 0
such that λn < λ̂ for all n ≥ n̂; this means that for “moderate” legal costs,
optimal deterrence is satisfied if the number of previous cases that have been
terminated by trial is greater or equal to n̂.
Nevertheless, cheap litigation is not a sufficient condition for long-run
optimal deterrence: if no injurer ever engages in the activity—or if all injurers
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reach an out-of-court settlement—then no case will be terminated by trial
and the judge learns nothing from previous court decisions. As a result, the
risk of court error remains prohibitively large. For the strict liability rule
to be optimal—at least in the long run—it must therefore be the case that
AL injurers engage in the activity and make the separating offer V . Two
sufficient conditions for this are
λ◦ <
β − pL − pLC
1− 2pL
, and (12)
λ◦ <
1− pL − pLC
2− 2pL
. (13)
These conditions motivate the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Let λ̃ := min
{
β−pL−pLC
1−2pL
, 1−pL−pLC
2−2pL
}
.
a) If the initial court error is smaller than this cutoff, λ◦ < λ̃, then the
strict liability rule ensures long-run optimal deterrence.
b) If the initial court error is even smaller than the cutoff defined in
Proposition 1, λ◦ < λ̂ ≤ λ̃, then the strict liability rule is optimal right from
the beginning.
Proof. In order to prove the first part of the proposition, we have to show
that trials are possible when λ◦ < min
{
β−pL−pLC
1−2pL
, 1−pL−pLC
2−2pL
}
. Note that
λ◦ <
β−pL−pLC
1−2pL
implies UsepAL > 0 for all n; that is, AL injurers expect a positive
payoff (at least) from separating and, therefore, engage in the activity. From
λ◦ <
β−pL−pLC
1−2pL
it then follows by Lemma 1 that UsepAL > U
pool
AL
for all n;
accordingly, AL makes the separating offer V , which means that a dispute
will go to court with probability pL. The second part of the proposition
follows from Proposition 1. 
4.3 Equilibrium Characteristics
The previous analysis shows that the deterrent effect of the strict liability
rule depends on the extent of the initial court error and on the magnitude
of legal costs. The personal gain from the activity is another important fac-
tor: the qualitative impact of court error is different for high-gain activities
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(β > 1/2) than for low-gain activities (β < 1/2). Figures 1 and 2 character-
ize the equilibrium outcome of the model. The areas 1 to 5 represent the
sets of parameter configurations (C, λ◦) for which each of the following five
equilibrium scenarios will materialize:
1. Instantaneous optimal deterrence: The first-period injurer—and any
following injurer—will only engage in the activity if he is of type AL.
He makes a separating settlement offer which is accepted if the realized
harm is x and rejected if the realized harm is x; that is, AL will be
taken to court if the realized harm x.
2. Total deterrence: No injurer will ever engage in the activity; thus,
long-run optimal deterrence will not be accomplished.
3. Long-run optimal deterrence (I): The first-period injurer will engage
in the activity whether he is of type AL or AH ; he makes a separating
offer and is taken to court if the realized harm is x. Subsequent injurers
Figure 1: Deterrence under strict liability I; β > 1/2
1
2
1− β
pH−β
2pH−1
1−pH
pH
β−pL
pL
1
2
3
4 5
λ◦ =
β−pL−pLC
1−2pL
λ◦ = 1− β
λ◦ =
pH−β+pHC
2pH−1
λ◦ =
1−pL−pLC
2−2pL
λ◦ =
1−pH−pHC
2−2pH
λ◦
C
(plotted for pL = 0.35, β = 0.6 and pH = 0.7)
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will definitely engage in the activity when they are of type AL. When
they are of type AH , however, they will only engage in the activity if
the number of precedent court decisions is lower than a critical value.
That is, long-run optimal deterrence will be accomplished once enough
periods have been terminated by trial.
4. Long-run optimal deterrence (II): The first-period injurer will engage
in the activity whether he is of type AL or AH . When he is of type AL,
he makes a separating offer and is taken to court if the realized harm
is x. When he is of type AH , however, he makes a pooling offer and
is not taken to court. Like under scenario 3, subsequent injurers will
engage in the activity when they are of type AL; when they are of type
AH , they will only engage in the activity if the number of precedent
court decisions is lower than a critical value. Again, long-run optimal
deterrence will be accomplished after an initial time of underdeterrence.
Figure 2: Deterrence under strict liability II; β < 1/2.
1
2
1− β
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2pH−1
β−pL
1−2pL
1−pH
pH
β−pL
pL
1
2
λ◦ =
β−pL−pLC
1−2pL
λ◦ =
pH−β+pHC
2pH−1
λ◦ = 1− β
λ◦ =
1−pL−pLC
2−2pL
λ◦ =
1−pH−pHC
2−2pH
λ◦
C
(plotted for pL = 0.35, β = 0.45 and pH = 0.7)
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5. No deterrence: The first-period injurer—and any following injurer—
will engage in the activity whether he is of type AL or AH . He makes
a pooling offer and settles out of court with certainty. As a result,
long-run optimal deterrence will not be accomplished.
To sum up, Figures 1 and 2 indicate that long-run optimal deterrence will
not occur if the initial parameter configuration (C, λ◦) falls into area 2 or
area 5. The reason is a lack of trials: while no injurer will ever engage in
the activity in scenario 2, all legal disputes will be terminated by out-of-
court settlements in scenario 5. In either case no judge gets a chance to deal
with the activity and hence the probability of court error cannot decrease.
Moreover, it is immediately clear from the absence of an area 3, 4, and 5 in
Figure 2 that AH injurers will never engage in a low-gain activity—not even
if the initial court error is at its highest possible level. That is, for β < 1/2
the strict liability rule will either meet optimal deterrence right from the
beginning (scenario 1), or permanently prevent any activity (scenario 2).
5 Discussion
The present model characterizes the strict liability rule as a legal rule that is
robust against “moderate” risk of court error: if both the initial court error
and legal costs are sufficiently small then the strict liability rule will—at
least in the long run—deter high-risk injurers from the activity, while low-
risk injurers engage in the activity (optimal deterrence); otherwise, the rule
will either permanently deter both types of injurers (total deterrence), or not
deter injurers at all (no deterrence).
In what follows, we discuss the welfare implication of court error and ex-
amine the question whether, and if so, under what conditions it is better not
to enforce the strict liability rule. In the second part of the discussion we will
focus on the impact of legal costs: we argue that under certain circumstances
it can be welfare improving to waive the court fee. The discussion will be
closed with a comment on the case where the judge is allowed to estimate
the value of damages by incorporating not only the observed level of harm
but also exogenous information such as the likelihood of court error.
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Welfare analysis. Obviously, a fully informed social planner would simply
impose a ban on the activities of high-risk injurers and obtain the first-best
expected per-period welfare
W ∗ = µ (β − pL) ,
where µ denotes the proportion of AL injurers.
The strict liability rule leads to a similar welfare result when the initial
court error is sufficiently low and litigation costs are zero; i.e. iff λ◦ < λ̂ and
C = 0. However, litigation is costly and courts do make mistakes, so that we
are in a second-best world where two types of welfare losses are possible. The
first type of loss concerns the number of activities: it occurs if AL injurers
refrain from the activity (overdeterrence) or if AH injurers engage in the
activity (underdeterrence). The second type of welfare loss is the method
of dispute resolution: when a dispute is terminated by trial, the legal costs
involved imply a welfare loss.
Our results from the previous section suggest that overdeterrence applies
to scenario 2 and underdeterrence to scenario 5; underdeterrence is initially
also a problem under the scenarios 3 and 4, but it fades away over time. The
second type of welfare loss (legal costs) applies to scenarios 1, 3, and 4.
Lemma 4. Let W j◦ and W
j denote the short- and long-run expected per-
period welfare associated with scenario j. Social welfare under the strict lia-
bility rule may then be summarized as follows:
1. Instantaneous optimal deterrence: W 1◦ = W
1 = µ(β − pL − pLC).
2. Total deterrence: W 2◦ = W
2 = 0.
3. Long-run optimal deterrence (I):
W 3◦ = β − (µpL + (1− µ)pH)(1 + C) and W
3 = µ(β − pL − pLC).
4. Long-run optimal deterrence (II):
W 4◦ = β − µpL − (1− µ)pH − µpLC and W
4 = µ(β − pL − pLC).
5. No deterrence: W 5◦ = W
5 = β − µpL − (1− µ)pH .
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Since optimal deterrence is only possible if C < (β − pL)/pL, it is immedi-
ately clear that W 1◦ = W
1 = W 3 = W 4 > 0. Comparing the five scenarios
for the strict liability rule then implies that scenario 1 dominates scenarios
2–4.
The welfare comparison of scenarios 1 and 5, however, is not that clear-
cut: the average expected welfare level under no deterrence may be lower,
but also higher, than under optimal deterrence. This raises the question
under what conditions it would be welfare improving not to enforce the strict
liability rule. The following proposition suggests an answer.
Proposition 3. Let µ1 :=
pH−β
pH−β+pLC
and µ2 :=
pH−β
pH−pL
.
a) Given that the initial parameter configuration (C, λ◦) is such that sce-
nario 1 will materialize, the enforcement of the strict liability rule will reduce
welfare if µ ≥ µ1 and improve welfare if µ < µ1.
b) Given that scenario 2 will materialize, the enforcement of the strict
liability rule will reduce welfare if µ ≥ µ2 and improve welfare if µ < µ2.
c) Given that scenario 3 or 4 will materialize, the enforcement of the strict
liability rule will definitely reduce welfare if µ ≥ µ1, and it might improve,
reduce or have no effect on welfare if µ < µ1.
d) Given that scenario 5 will materialize, the enforcement of the strict
liability rule will neither improve nor reduce welfare.
Proof. First, in the absence of liability both types of injurers will engage
in the activity and so the expected per-period welfare must be given by
W ′ = β − µpL − (1 − µ)pH which is the same value as under scenario 5;
from this follows immediately part d) of the proposition. Second, for µ ≥ µ1
it holds true that W ′ ≥ W 1◦ = W
1 = W 3 = W 4 and W ′ > W 4◦ > W
3
◦ ;
that is, the expected per-period welfare in absence of liability is larger than
the expected per-period welfare under (long-run) optimal deterrence; this
motivates part a) and c) of the proposition. Finally, note that W ′ turns
positive if µ ≥ µ2 which implies part b) of the proposition. 
Remark. Proposition 3 suggests that the strict liability rule should definitely
not be enforced if the proportion of low-risk injurers is larger than a certain
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value; i.e. if µ ≥ max
{
pH−β
pH−β+pLC
, pH−β
pH−pL
}
. This expression is equivalent to
the condition (1 − µ)(pH − β) ≤ min {µpLC, µ(β − pL)} which states that
the average welfare loss of not enforcing the strict liability rule is lower than
both the average expected welfare loss under optimal deterrence and the
average expected welfare loss under total deterrence. To get some intuition
for this result, recall that for µ ≥ pH−β
pH−pL
the proportion of high-risk injurers
is low enough such that the expected per-period welfare is positive even
if both possible types of injurer engage in the activity. Thus, enforcing the
strict liability rule can only be welfare improving if the expected enforcement
costs fall short of the enforcement gain, i.e. if µpLC < (1 − µ)(pH − β), or
µ ≥ pH−β
pH−β+pLC
.
The role of legal costs. The magnitude of legal costs is an important
determining factor for the deterrent effect of the strict liability rule: this is
true not only in the presence of court error, but also in general.
As mentioned earlier, the strict liability rule will only ensures long-run
optimal deterrence if the initial court error is lower than the cutoff defined
in Proposition 2, λ◦ < λ̃. This cutoff is a decreasing function in C and so
its inverse, C̃ = min
{
(1−pL)(1−2λ◦)
pL
, β−pL−(1−2pL)λ◦
pL
}
, can be interpreted as an
upper bound for legal costs. That is, long-run optimal deterrence will not be
accomplished if legal costs are larger than this cutoff, C ≥ C̃.
Legal costs consist of many different components, one of which is the court
fee. Since the judge can directly determine the court fee to be borne by the
injurer, he can (to a certain extent) influence the extent of the parameter
C in our model. This, however, suggests that whenever C ≥ C̃ it may be
welfare improving to waive the court fee for those injurers who are the first
to decide on the activity. That is, if this temporary reduction in court costs
pushes C below C̃, then the risk of court error will decrease with each period
that is terminated in trial and, as a result, the deterrent effect of the strict
liability rule becomes optimal over time
Nevertheless, waiving the court fee does not always improve welfare. Note
that for β < pL + (1 − 2pL)λ◦ the expected net benefit of engaging in the
activity is negative for bothAH andAL injurers; this means that even low-risk
23
injurers would refrain from the activity if litigation was for free. Moreover,
waiving the court fee is welfare reducing if C ≥ 1−µ
µ
pH−β
pL
. As mentioned in
the pervious paragraph, in this case the expected per-period welfare is lower
under optimal deterrence than under no deterrence and, therefore, the strict
liability rule should not be enforced.
A more sophisticated fact-finding process. Court error in this paper
has been modeled by the assumption that the judge sometimes mistakes
the true level of harm and then awards high damages to a victim who has
suffered low harm, or low damages to a victim who has suffered high harm.
The implication of this approach is that court error will increase the expected
damage award for low harm and decrease the expected damage award for high
harm. This implies that a high-risk injurer can expect to pay less in damages
than the average harm he will cause with his activity, while a low-risk injurer
must expect to pay more. As a result, both too much and too little activity
is possible.
So far, the focus of the analysis has been on the litigants’ decisions rather
than the decisions in court. What we have largely ignored is that a ratio-
nal judge might anticipate potential court error. Following the concept of
Rasmusen (1995), the judge’s fact-finding process under court error should
be divided into two steps: first, measuring the value of the damages given
the evidence presented for the particular case, and, second, estimating the
value of damages by incorporating not only the measured damage but also
exogenous information such as typical damage levels and the likelihood of
measurement error.
However, since in this model the effect of court error is not simply to bias
damage awards upwards by an average amount ε, the judge cannot easily
adjust his damage award by subtracting ε from his initial measurement. The
problem in the present model is that the measurement bias in the case of low
harm goes in the opposite direction than the measurement bias in the case
of high harm. To make the expected damage award match the true level of
harm as closely as possible, the judge should award less than x if he observes
x and more than x if he observes x. Specifically, the shifted awards should
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be
D(x) = x−
λn
1− 2λn
if the measured harm is x, and
D(x) = x+
λn
1− 2λn
if the measured harm is x.
Remark. Whether or not the judge should be permitted to go beyond mea-
suring the harm level to estimate damages is a legal question that lies outside
the scope of economic analysis. However, note that even in the case where
the judge is allowed to go beyond measuring, he cannot optimally respond
to large court error because limλn→1/2 D(x) = −∞ and limλn→1/2D(x) = ∞.
6 Conclusion
The present model examines the impact of court error on the deterrent effect
of the strict liability rule. Our analysis demonstrates that depending on the
personal gain of the activity, court error can cause both too little and too
much activity. While underdeterrence may only be a problem in the context
of high-gain activities, overdeterrence may be a problem in the context of
high-gain and low-gain activities. We find that—due to positive external-
ity of litigation—the problem of underdeterrence may disappear over time.
For this to happen, however, it is necessary that some cases are decided by
judges. Since court error increases the likelihood of an out-of-court settle-
ment, this will not be the case if the initial error rate is too high. Moreover,
if overdeterrence is the initial problem, then the strict liability rule will not
become optimal. If no injurer ever engages in the activity, it is impossible for
the judge to learn from previous trials and so the error rate cannot decrease.
That is, if the strict liability rule deters too much activity in the short run,
it will also deter too much activity in the long run. However, if the strict
liability rule deters too little activity in the short run, it might still become
optimal in the long run. As a result, we conclude that the strict liability rule
is robust against “moderate” risk of court error. If both the initial error rate
and legal costs are sufficiently small then the strict liability rule will—at least
in the long run—provide efficient activity incentives to low-risk and high-risk
injurers.
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